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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Russell Glenn Davis appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence found during a search of his person. In the district court, he 
asserted that he was illegally detained near an apartment where a search was taking 
place. He also asserted that he was illegally frisked, and that the officers conducting 
the apartment search lacked probable cause to arrest him. The district court denied the 
suppression motion because it found that Mr. Davis was sufficiently on the premises 
being searched to detain him, and there was probable cause to arrest him. 
Subsequently, Mr. Davis entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving his right to 
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Davis argued that he was not in the immediate 
vicinity of the premises being searched when he was detained by Air Force agents in 
front of the apartment complex, and there was no nexus between Mr. Davis and the 
activity giving rise to the search at the time of his detention. While the search was 
taking place in an upstairs apartment of a quad-plex, he was detained on the ground 
level, in front of the building. Therefore, he was not in the immediate vicinity of the 
apartment being searched. 
The State argues that because Officer Jessup, who was searching the upstairs 
apartment, had confiscated an occupant's cell phone and intercepted text messages 
from Mr. Davis, the collective knowledge doctrine applied to this situation. This is a 
misunderstanding of the collective knowledge doctrine; Officer Jessup never 
communicated information about those texts to the Air Force agent in front of the 
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apartment building who detained Mr. Davis. Therefore, the agent who detained 
Mr. Davis possessed no knowledge that could have provided him with reasonable 
suspicion to detain Mr. Davis. Further, the agent received no directive from any other 
law enforcement officer who possessed reasonable suspicion or probable cause, which 
would have supported detaining Mr. Davis. 
The State also argues that probable cause was established to arrest Mr. Davis 
when he first approached the apartment complex, and, because there was probable 
cause, the search of Mr. Davis was valid incident to his arrest. This argument fails for 
three reasons. First, the State continues to mistakenly rely on the collective knowledge 
doctrine. Second, it conflates the district court's findings of fact. And third, although the 
district court did not need to reach the issue of whether probable cause existed because 
Mr. Davis's initial detention was illegal, the State fails to acknowledge that the district 
court was correct when it found that probable cause to arrest and search Mr. Davis was 
only established after Officer Jessup went downstairs to speak with Mr. Davis. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Davis's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court's denial of Mr. Davis's motion to suppress was error because 
Mr. Davis was never in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched and there 
was no nexus between Mr. Davis and the activity giving rise to the search at the time of 
his detention. 
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The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Davis's Motion To Suppress Because 
Mr. Davis Was Never In The Immediate Vicinity Of The Premises To Be Searched And 
There Was No Nexus Between Mr. Davis And The Activity Giving Rise To The Search 
At The Time Of His Detention 
I ntrod u ctio n 
Russell Davis entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to deliver, preserving his right to challenge the 
district court's order denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Davis asserts that the district 
court erred in denying his Motion to 
Amendment rights in that the who possessed no 
suspicion, much probable criminal activity that would have allowed for a 
legal detention of Mr. Davis. 
The State's arguments to the contrary fail because the collective knowledge 
doctrine did not apply here, and probable cause to arrest Mr. Davis was not established 
until well after his initial, illegal detention. 
B. The State's Argument Regarding The Collective Knowledge Doctrine Fails 
Because There Was No Communication From An Officer With Knowledge, 
Which Is A Requirement Of The Doctrine 
In response to Mr. Davis's argument that he was illegally detained by Agent 
Shaiyah, the State argues that the collective knowledge doctrine applied in this 
situation. (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) It does not. Since the State properly recites the facts 
of the case, its reliance on the doctrine appears to be a result of a misunderstanding of 
the doctrine itself. 
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The State cites to State v. Baxter, 144 Idaho 672, 678 (Ct. App. 2007), for the 
rule that "[t]he totality of the circumstances known to police is measured by the 
collective, not individual knowledge of the police." (Resp. Br., p.10.) This is obviously a 
true statement, but the State fails to delve into the crucial elements of the collective 
knowledge doctrine. Therefore, it makes the mistaken assumption that as long as one 
officer possesses some knowledge about a suspect, that knowledge is automatically 
imputed to all the other officers on scene. Indeed, the State fails to acknowledge that 
there must be some type of communication, based on one officer's knowledge of facts 
that establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause, which is first transmitted to 
another officer in order for the doctrine to apply. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals explained the parameters of the collective 
knowledge doctrine in State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961 (Ct. App. 2004 ). There, the 
Court cited United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), and said that "an officer who 
makes an investigatory stop in reliance upon a report or bulletin from another law 
enforcement officer or agency need not have personal knowledge of the facts that 
underlay the report so long as the person who generated the report possessed the 
requisite reasonable suspicion." Van Dorne, 139 Idaho at 963 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). The Court of Appeals went on to say that the Hensley Court 
Id. 
explained that the admissibility of evidence derived from the stop turns 
not upon whether the officer who acted in reliance upon a report or 
bulletin possessed reasonable suspicion, but on whether the officer who 
issued the report or bulletin had knowledge of articulable facts supporting 
a reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is or has been 
involved in criminal activity. 
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Thus the collective knowledge doctrine clearly depends on some sort of 
communication taking place between officers; that communication can be indirect - in 
the form of a bulletin for example - or direct, but it must occur. Here, there was no such 
communication. There is nothing in the record indicating that Officer Jessup, when he 
viewed the text messages from Mr. Davis, communicated to the agents below that they 
should detain Mr. Davis if he arrived at the complex. The texts may have given Officer 
Jessup reasonable suspicion, but Agent Shaiyah knew nothing about them or Mr. Davis. 
In fact, when Agent Shaiyah detained Mr. Davis, he had no idea that Officer Jessup had 
seen the texts, and no idea who Mr. Davis was or where he was headed. Officer 
Jessup, the only officer to have formulated a suspicion in his mind based on facts 
available only to him, issued no report or bulletin to anyone. Therefore, the State's 
reliance on the collective knowledge doctrine is misplaced. Agent Shaiyah detained 
Mr. Davis illegally. 
C. The State's Other Arguments Fail As They Are Based On The Mistaken 
Assumption That, Because The Collective Knowledge Doctrine Applied, The 
Agents Downstairs Had Probable Cause To Detain Mr. Davis 
The State's original mistake about the collective knowledge doctrine carries over 
into its other arguments. For example, the State says that when Agent Shaiyah 
detained Mr. Davis, "the police had probable cause to arrest Davis, let alone detain him 
for a few minutes to verify his identity and his connection with the apartments." (Resp. 
Br., p.11.) The State bases this on a misreading of the facts as found in the district 
court and a misunderstanding of the collective knowledge doctrine. It states that 
Thus, the totality of the circumstances known to the police was as follows: 
In a series of text messages, Davis agreed to deliver drugs to a resident of 
apartment B202. Davis sent a text message to let the resident of the 
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apartment 8202 know that he would be coming to the apartment soon. 
Shortly after this text message was received, Davis arrived at the 
apartment complex in his SUV. Davis emerged from the vehicle and 
approached the apartment, carrying a bulge in of something in his pocket 
Officers affirmatively identified Davis. That is sufficient evidence for police 
to have probable cause to arrest Davis. 
(Resp. Br. pp.8-9.) This is not true. In order to reach this conclusion, the State 
continues to depend on the mistaken idea that simply because Officer Jessup had 
viewed the texts, the agents downstairs were presumed to know about them under the 
collective knowledge doctrine. As made clear above, that is not the way the doctrine 
works. Also, there was no finding in the district court that the agents saw a bulge in 
Mr. Davis's pocket. Indeed, the district court made it clear that Officer Jessup was the 
first one to notice the bulge. (R., p.52.) Therefore, the agents did not have reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to detain, arrest, or search Mr. Davis when he was stopped 
by Agent Shaiyah. And, while the district court did not need to reach the issue of 
whether probable cause was established (because Mr. Davis's initial detention was 
illegal), it was correct when it found that probable cause could not have been 
established until after Officer Jessup left the apartment and went downstairs to question 
Mr. Davis. 
The State also repeats the district court's language to argue that Mr. Davis's 
detention was legal. It states that Mr. Davis was "sufficiently on the premises to be 
detained for a few minutes .... " (Resp. Br., p.12.) And it relies on State v. Pierce, 137 
Idaho 296 (Ct. App. 2002), for the proposition that "persons who arrive at the premises 
during a search may be detained .... " (Resp. Br., p.12.) Again, the State correctly 
recites the law but ignores the salient facts of this case that make that law irrelevant. As 
argued in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Davis had most certainly not arrived at the premises, 
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nor was he in the immediate vicinity of the premises when he was detained. (See App. 
Br., pp.10-11.) He had not even walked up the stairs. Therefore, it was impossible for 
Agent Shaiyah to know who Mr. Davis was, or where he was going, at that point. 
Finally, in response to Mr. Davis's argument that State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 
911 (Ct. App. 2007), controlled this situation because, just as in Reynolds, Agent 
Shaiyah had no knowledge of a connection between Mr. Davis and the criminal activity 
that gave rise to the warrant, the State asserts that Reynolds "does not aid Davis's 
argument." (Resp. Br., p.12.) It bases this assertion on the fact that Reynolds involved 
a probation search. (Resp. Br., p.12.) But, as argued in the Appellant's Brief, the 
Reynolds Court actually stated that "[e]ven if the officers had been conducting a search 
pursuant to a warrant instead of a probation search, this Court's holding in Kester and 
Pierce only authorized the detention of individuals found on the premises being 
searched .... " (See App. Br., pp12-13.) Therefore, the Reynolds Court addressed the 
State's argument here. 
In this case, law enforcement did not, as the State asserts, have "probable cause 
to arrest Davis, let alone detain him" when Agent Shaiyah stopped Mr. Davis. (Resp. 
Br., p.13.) Mr. Davis was not on the premises or in the immediate vicinity of the 
premises, and Agent Shaiyah had no reason to detain him when he did. Therefore, the 
detention was illegal, and the evidence collected after that detention must be 
suppressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Davis respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment 
of conviction and order of retained jurisdiction, reverse the order denying his motion to 
suppress, and this case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 21 st day of January, 2015. 
~ J. /;4--~-·----·(.--"----~------
REED P. ANDERSON/ ·._"1 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 st day of January, 2015, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
RUSSELL GLENN DAVIS 
320 SHAVER ST 
BERRYVILLE AR 72616 
LYNN NORTON 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
MARCO DEANGELO 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Courj:; 
•,,~ 
EVAN A. SMITH ',, 
Administrative Assistant 
RPA/eas 
10 
) 
